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Abstract 
 
 
The low depth of the Argentine financial system raises concerns about its potential for 
development, even under favorable macroeconomic expectations. Contributing to the analysis of this 
key industry, this paper develops a methodology to measure the evolution of market power of financial 
intermediaries in the Argentine market. The proposed alternative framework models the industry 
production, and takes into account the duality of the financial intermediation business. 
The structural model follows the guidelines of the New Empirical Industrial Organization 
(NEIO) and the discrete choice literature, adapting the analysis to the local industry. The paper finds 
evidence supporting the presence of market power in the financial intermediation industry, but also 
finds signs of increase in the level of competition. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Financial intermediation services have been scarcely developed in Argentina, which can be 
attributed to different structural factors, such us the persistent uncertainty about the sustainability of 
growth. Furthermore, the low depth of the Argentine financial system has raised doubts about its 
potential development, even under relatively favorable macroeconomic expectations. Contributing to 
the analysis of such key industry1, the current paper uses balance sheets of the financial intermediary 
institutions of Argentina to measure the evolution of their market power during the period 2005:q1-
2007:q1. This period showed relatively stable financial conditions and favorable macroeconomic 
perspectives. Therefore, studying the evolution of Lerner indexes, price-cost margins, as indicators of 
the degree of competition in the industry, is interesting in terms of its potential of development.  
This study contributes to the existing literature of “New Empirical Industrial Organization” 
(NEIO) applied to financial intermediation industry in two ways. This is the first paper to estimate 
Lerner indexes for the financial intermediary industry of Argentina using structural demand models, 
and also this study proposes a model that has some differences compared with other models in the 
literature.  
The framework to calculate Lerner indexes considers that market shares are not an accurate 
measure to evaluate the market power when firms offer differentiated products2. That is, degrees of 
substitution among relevant products also affect the market power. Then I calculate price-cost margins 
as percentages of the prices (Lerner indexes) in the loans and investment services.  Regarding the first 
contribution, I followed a methodology prevalent in the “discrete choice” literature to estimate demand 
systems of differentiated products (See McFadden, 1973, 1978, 1981; Berry, 1994; Berry, Levinsohn 
and Pakes, 1995; Bresnahan et al., 1997; and Nevo, 2001), jointly with a model of firm conduct. This 
structural model of the financial industry considers an oligopolistic price setting competition where 
firms reach a pure strategy Nash-Bertrand equilibrium. Moreover, the model in this paper follows the 
spirit of the economic value-added approach that classifies not only loans but deposits as outputs 
(rather than inputs), based on the service of safe storage value, record keeping and means of payments 
that entities provide. Furthermore, deposits and other services of financial investment may also be 
considered outputs because investors who face restrictions to operate in financial markets demand 
them. As a result, the existence of these services requires a differential between the passive interest 
rates received by consumers and the interest rates paid by low risk assets in the financial market. A 
rationale for this is provided by the theory of FISIM (“financial intermediation services indirectly 
measured”) in the System of National Accounts of 1993. Under this framework, the proposed model 
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 A broad literature relates this industry with the growth and development capabilities of a country. For instance see Demirguc-Kunt and 
Levine (2001). 
2
 Se table 4 in appendix C 
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uses two different rates of references whose conceptual framework come from the user cost theory of 
prices of financial services. (See Wang, 2003; and Fixler, Reinsdorf and Smith, 2008) 
On the demand side, theoretical preferences are aggregated into market-level demand systems 
whose parameters are estimated through log transformations of two different models: the multinomial 
and the nested logit. I use a multinomial logit modified to consider some persistence in the individual 
choice and a nested logit approach to relax the assumption of independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA). In the nested logit specification, entities are classified according to whether their 
main business is targeted toward individual or institutional customers. The estimation strategy of the 
demand functions involves Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) methodologies and instrumental 
variables to avoid the simultaneity problem, given that the interest rates, the benefits and the market 
concentration are determined all together. GMM is useful for obtaining instruments for predetermined 
variables correlated to contemporaneous unobserved demand shocks while additional instrumental 
variables are used for endogenous demand characteristics like prices (see Anderson and Hsiao 1982; 
Blundell and Bond 1998; and Arellano and Honoré 2001). Then two different groups of demands are 
estimated; on one hand the demands for services of financial investments and, on the other hand, the 
demands for loans.  
On the supply side, the model has a functional form for the profits of the entities and their 
balance sheet constraints. The former considers the opportunity cost of the funds obtained directly 
from their customers. Thus, incomes coming from the services of financial investments take into 
account two different interest rates: the interest rate of the bonds issued by the Central Bank and the 
interbank rate, depending on the opportunity cost of the funds.  
Subsequently, it is assumed that the observed data comes from market equilibriums where 
firms and consumers optimize their objective functions, profits and utilities. A Nash-Bertrand 
equilibrium gives the pricing rules for the financial institution, where each institution considers the 
consequences of changing its price assuming that its competitors do not modify their own prices. 
Under the existence of an interior equilibrium of pure strategy and prices strictly positive, constant 
marginal costs are calculated and then all the necessary information to construct the Lerner Index of 
each entity becomes available. 
Regarding the second contribution, this study proposes a model that has some differences 
compared with other models in the literature. Following, there is a comparative analysis of the related 
literature. 
The papers of Fernández de Guevara et. al. (2005), Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2003), 
Richards, Acharya and Kagan (2008), Dick (2007) and Adams, Brevoort and Kiser (2007)3 make 
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 4
significant contributions to the relevant literature, using similar methodologies to study financial 
intermediation industries. 
On one hand, some papers consider a theoretical model, but the Lerner indexes are empirically 
calculated and the marginal costs come from a translogarithmic cost function. For instance, Fernández 
de Guevara et. al. (2005) derive the theoretical determinants of the Lerner Index using the model of 
Corvoisier and Gropp (2001). In this model, the banks are assumed to be price takers for their 
liabilities and to fix prices in the loan market. Additionally, the model does not provide a method to 
calculate Lerner indexes, which are obtained through an empirical approximation. I propose a broader 
model, not only applicable to banks but also to other financial institutions, with two different rates of 
references and where financial institutions are not price takers in either market. Moreover, Lerner 
indexes can be calculated directly from this model, which allows the existence of market power not 
only in the pricing of loans, but also in the pricing of deposits.  
Among these papers also are Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2003), which follow the 
model of Ho and Saunders (1981) and incorporate the criticism of Lerner (1981) to derive 
determinants of the interest margins. Using an empirical approach, they calculate Lerner indexes for 
the European banking sector and use them among the explanatory variables of the net interest margins. 
The theoretical model considers one reference rate, the money market interest rate, and assumes that 
the wealth of banks is based on incomes from financial intermediation and money market assets. In 
this framework, the banks are risk-averse and maximize their expected utility of the level of wealth. 
Alternatively, my approach does not attempt to model the wealth of institutions or their risk aversion; 
it models a portion of the business4, making abstraction of those funds that institutions can obtain 
independently of their financial obligations. It also assumes that the credits and interest rates risks are 
given for each institution and that they are part of the costs of financial intermediation services. 
Furthermore, this model uses two different rates of references, considering a more suitable assumption 
for developing countries, where it is likely that entities do not have access to a perfectly competitive 
wholesale fund market.  
On the other hand, there are papers that use structural demand models to study financial 
intermediation industries. For instance, Richards, Acharya and Kagan (2008) use a multinomial logit 
model of discrete choice with spatial differentiation of banking demand and pricing behavior. They 
compute a spatial likelihood function to estimate the degree of market power exercised by banks in 
non-metropolitan areas of the United States in 2005. Their model considers that the outputs of the 
banks are only the total loans outstanding and finds that geography has a relatively small role in the 
total market power exercised. Another one is Dick (2007), which estimates a structural demand model 
for commercial bank deposit services to measure the effects on consumer welfare in the U.S. banking 
industry in the '90s. The characteristic-based demand systems for deposit services are estimated 
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through OLS and two-stage least squares, and the results suggest that consumers on average have 
gained from the observed branching expansion process. Besides Adams, Brevoort and Kiser (2007) 
use the non-nested, discrete-choice random utility model developed by Bresnahan et al. (1997) to 
model a consumer’s choice of depository institution using a panel data set covering the U.S. from 
1990–2001. They assume that each institution has access to a perfectly competitive wholesale fund 
market, where the firms can borrow or lend funds at the prevailing interest rate. Their paper measures 
the degree of substitutability across specific groupings of institutions; it finds that substitution is 
greater within a given group than among groups.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the specification of the 
structural demands. The estimation strategy and instruments are presented in Section III. Then the 
database is discussed in Section IV and the results of the parameters of the demand systems are in 
Section V. The model of firm conduct is described in sections VI and VII, where the obtained results 
are used to calculate price elasticities and Lerner indexes. Some further details and tables can be found 
in the appendixes. Finally, Section VIII summarizes conclusions.  
 
II. Structural demands of financial intermediation services 
 
The model assumes that financial intermediaries offer two kinds of services: services of 
deposits5 and services of loans. Note that deposits are considered services because the firms of the 
industry make financial investments more accessible than do capital markets. The firms also give 
loans to targeted populations that find other sources of financing more restrictive. Therefore, passive 
interest rates paid for services of deposits have a discount for this service and active interest rates 
charged for loans include an additional charge for the financing service. 
This paper will develop two different models for the demands of the financial intermediaries 
following the “discrete choice” literature (McFadden, 1973, 1978, 1981; Berry, 1994; Berry, 
Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995; Nevo, 2001). The first approach is based on a multinomial logit while the 
second is based on a nested logit model. Both of them define consumer preferences over product 
characteristics (to avoid the estimation of numerous parameters) and assume that consumers have 
solved their intertemporal saving problem and that they only need to choose a firm to consume 
financial services.  
Multinomial Logit approach 
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 Here deposits are making reference to a broader definition that is not only bank accounts that represent a liability for financial 
intermediaries, but also other funds that represent amounts owed by financial intermediaries to customers. 
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Each consumer n  is assumed to have already solved his dynamic long-term savings-
indebtedness problem before choosing financial institutions j  to contract investment or loan services. 
Assuming that 1,2,...,t T=  markets are observed, equation (1) is the conditional indirect utility of 
consumer n from choosing firm j ’s services of deposits (supra-index d ) in the market t . Likewise, 
equation (1) may be written for the conditional indirect utility of consumer n  from choosing firm j ’s 
services of loans (supra-index l ) in the market t 6. The term njt∈ represents consumer heterogeneity, 
idiosyncratic deviations respect to the mean utility, which is assumed to have an IID extreme value 
distribution. 
 
( ) ( )( )                         ~ exp  exp expd d d dnjt jt njt njt ijt ijtu withδ= +∈ ∈ −∈ − −∈                                                   (1) 
 
( )1 1 1 1 1 lnd d d d d d djt jt jt jt jt j jtp r s xδ β α λ γ ζ ξ−= + + + + +                      1, 2,...,0,1,...,
1, 2,...,
n N
where j J
t T
=

=

=
                                    (2) 
 
Where djtr is the implicit passive interest rate of firm j  in period t  and in the case of utility 
for a consumer of financing services it is replaced for ljtr , the implicit active interest rate of firm j . 
With djtp  and 
l
jtp  as proxies for the implicit price charged by commissions related to deposits and 
loans respectively; djtx  and 
l
jtx  as a row vector of relevant characteristics for investment or loan 
services; jζ  as the unobserved characteristics of the product that remained constant; a mean zero 
random disturbance jtξ  that represents changes in unobservables that affects consumers equally and 
the taste parameters ( ), , ,θ β α λ γ= . Additionally, and modifying the standard specification, we will 
include as a relevant variable the log of the market share in the precedent period, 1
d
jts −  or 1
l
jts − , that is 
a proxy for the inertial component of certain financial operations (for instance, term deposits and loans 
with several disbursements). The lags may also be a proxy for characteristics that are used by 
customers for solving the informational problem that they face. That is, customers face costs in 
screening and choosing an institution and they might interpret an observed lagged higher market share 
as good signal. 
The observed characteristics are control variables that should capture differences in the quality 
or kind of offered products. Some characteristics are fixed assets per branch, workers per branch, 
business development expenses per branch, density of branches in the provinces, number of provinces 
where the entity operates, number of ATMs, personal loans as percentage of total loans and number of 
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branches in relatively small provinces7. Besides, some characteristics related to indicators of 
vulnerability of the portfolio of loans and deposits are also included such us loan loss as percentage of 
assets and fixed term deposits as percentage of deposits. For further details about the control variables 
included in each specification see table 1 and appendix B.   
The model has two outside goods, one for the loan and other for the deposit market, and their 
consumer sn'  utility is given by the equation (3) where 0j = . The mean utility of the outside good is 
not identified and it is supposed that 0 0ζ =  (from here on, the supra-indexes is omitted because the 
following explanation is the same for both markets).  
0 0 0 0n t t n tu ζ ξ= + + ∈                                                                                                                          (3) 
Consumers choose a firm-product according to its relative utility. Thus, the market share is the 
joint probability of obtaining higher consumers’ utilities of the product j  and it is given by the 
equation (4).  
( ) ( ) njtProb |    where ~jt jt njt rt nrts r j l iidδ δ ⋅ = + ∈ > + ∈ ∀ ≠ ∈ ∈                                                                                               (4)                
Assuming that 
njt∈  are independent and identically distributed with a Gumbel distribution, the 
integral (5) has an analytical solution (see McFadden, 1973) that is equation (6). 
( ) ( )
0
Prob + |  ( ) jt irt ijt jt rt ijt ijt ijt
r j
s f dδ δ
≠ ≠
⋅ = ∈ <∈ − ∈ ∈ ∈∏∫                                                                          (5) 
As a result, market shares jts do not depend on consumers’ characteristics, they depend only 
on options’ characteristics, where 
 njt jt jδ δ= ∀ . Note that if two product-firms have the same observable 
characteristics, the model predicts the same market share for both. 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
1
0
1
exp
    0
1 expexp
                         
1exp
    0
1 exp
jt
J
rtjt
r
jt jt jtJ
rt J
r
rt
r
j
s con s
j
δ
δδ
δ
δ
δ
=
=
=

 ∀ ≠
 +

= ⋅ = 

=
+

∑
∑
∑
                                                        (6) 
 
Equation (7) is the normalization of (6) respect to the outside option. 
 
( )
( ) ( )0 exp    
jt
jt
t
s j
s
δ⋅ = ∀
⋅
                                                                                                                              (7) 
The standard definition of the share of a firm in the market is its amount of operations over the 
total amount of operations of the industry. However, in this paper the definition of the shares must 
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 In addition there are several dummy variables included: dummy for large entities, dummy for entities that provided more than 20% of their 
loans to individuals, dummy for entities that provided more than 25% of their loans as pledge loans, dummy for entities that provided more 
than 18% of their loans as credit card loans, dummy for non-banking entity, dummy for changes in the ownership of the institution and 
dummy for public institution. 
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include the outside options for investment or loans (depending on the relevant market) which represent 
the alternative of not consuming these services from the financial institutions in the sample. These 
variables depend on the definition of the potential size of the markets and therefore on the definition 
of a relevant unit of operations8. The shares of the firms can be recalculated based on the potential size 
of the market, tM , that is the product of the relevant unit of operations and the relevant population. 
Thus, the unit of operations is the weighted average across entities of the amount of operations over 
the quantity of operations, and the relevant population is calculated based on the country population 
over the poverty line (See appendix B for further details). 
Finally, equation (8) is one of the equations to be estimated. That is the logarithmic difference 
between market shares which is equal to the mean utility. 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )0 1 1 1 1 1ln ln                      donde:  lnd d d d d d d d d djt t jt jt jt jt jt jt j jts s p r s xδ δ β α λ γ ζ ξ−⋅ − ⋅ = = + + + + +             (8) 
Active interest rates are expected to hold a negative relationship with mean utilities in 
equation (8), contrarily to passive rates in equation (9). 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )0 2 2 2 1 2ln ln                      donde:  lnL L L L L L L L L Ljt t jt jt jt jt jt jt j jts s p r s xδ δ β α λ γ ζ ξ−⋅ − ⋅ = = + + + + +             (9) 
The linear specification of (8) and (9) make possible to apply OLS methods to estimate the 
values of its parameters. Nevertheless, OLS is not a consistent estimator mostly due to the endogeneity 
of the prices. Thus, section III proposes consistent estimators for this specification. 
Nested logit approach 
In a logit model the probabilities for all the different alternatives change by the same 
proportion when an attribute of another particular alternative changes. This structure of substitution 
among alternatives may not be appropriate for the industry of financial intermediary services. 
To capture implicit sources of correlation among the unobserved portions of utility, an 
alternative approach to model consumer decision-making assumes that the vector of unobserved utility
n∈ has a cumulative distribution generalized extreme value distribution (GEV) of the equation (10). 
/
1
exp nj
k
K
k j B
e
τ
τ−∈
= ∈
  
 
−  
   
∑ ∑                                                                                                          (10) 
Where 1,   k K= …  denote the different non-overlapping subsets of products (nests) and τ is 
a measure of the degree of independence in unobserved utility among the alternatives in nest k9. A 
nested logit model is appropriate when the set of alternatives faced by a consumer can be partitioned 
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 See the details in the data section and appendix B variables Pares_cred y Pares_obl. 
9
 Note that when 1τ = the nested logit model becomes a standard logit. 
 9
into nests. In this case the nests are defined based on whether the products are mainly oriented to 
institutional customers or individual customers10. 
The nested logit model reduces the inconvenience of independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA), that is equality among the cross-elasticities11, by allowing consumer preferences to 
be correlated within product categories. Under this model the IIA holds within each nest but it is not 
valid among nests. That is, for any two alternatives in different nests, the ratio of probabilities can 
depend on the attributes of other alternatives in the two nests. Therefore, if an alternative were 
removed, the probabilities of choosing any alternative in the same nest increase equally, but this 
increase would be different in case of alternatives of other nests. It is intuitive that if an institution 
oriented to offer financial products to firms (in nest 1k = ) would be removed, the increase in the 
probabilities of choosing an institution oriented to individual customers (in nest 2k = ) would be less 
than the one among products of nest 1k = .  
Then under the nested logit model expression, equation (11) is the logarithmic difference 
between market shares. Where 
kBjts | is the market share of institution j , which belongs to nest kB , as 
a fraction of the total nest share. See Berry (1994) for further references. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
kBjtjttjt sss |0 ln1lnln τδ −+=−                                                                                              (11) 
Where 
 jt jt jt jt j jtp r xδ β α γ ζ ξ= + + + + . Thus the estimation of the parameters in (11) requires 
more instruments, given that the 
kBjts |  are endogenous. Thus, section III also proposes consistent 
estimators for this specification. 
III. Methodology of estimation and instruments 
The models in equations (8) (9) and (11) include idiosyncratic constants to consider factors 
that differ among entities but remain constant during the period. Nevertheless, the estimation of the 
parameters of the demand functions cannot be recovered by fixed effects methodologies, given that 
characteristics like prices and shares of the products in their nest are endogenous (that is, correlated 
with unobserved factors). As a result, the demand equations are differentiated to be estimated using 
instruments in place of their endogenous variables.  
Despite the different specifications of the demand of loan and investment services, the 
instruments can be classified as supply side variables, or cost shifters, exogenous characteristics, 
predetermined characteristics and characteristics of the competitor firms (BLP instruments, see Berry, 
Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995). Cost shifter variables affect the marginal cost and only have an impact 
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 Note that the outside option is the only alternative of its nest. 
11
 See appendix A. 
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on the demand quantities through the market prices. Then labor costs per worker and general costs per 
branch are the available cost shifter instruments in the sample12. Additionally, we assume that demand 
unobservables are mean independent of some firm characteristics and then they are taken as 
exogenous. For instance, the decision to open a branch is determined by strategies to attract new 
customers, and not by the number of existing customers. Then shocks that affect the demand of the 
firm in previous periods must not have an impact on these characteristics. This is the case of variables 
such as the number of ATMs, branches, provinces with branches, branch density, employee per branch 
and dummy variables that identify whether the firm is public and the main type of loans offered.  
Nevertheless, we cannot assume all the observable characteristics are exogenous. Other 
characteristics might be determined contemporaneously with the share of the entity in the market and 
they may be instrumented by their lags. Among these characteristics are those related to indicators of 
risks of firms (such as non-performing loans and loan loss provisions), organizational and 
development expenses and market participations in previous periods. 
Finally, BLP instruments are competitors’ characteristics such as branches per firm, workers 
per branch, non-performing loans, branch density and organizational and development expenses. 
Given that products with close substitutes tend to have lower markups, competitors’ characteristics are 
expected to be correlated with their prices, while the demand of the product only depends on its own 
characteristics. Likewise, in the nested logit specification, the characteristics of other firms in their 
nest are also instruments for the market share of one firm in its nest (see Berry, 1994) that is the 
additional term in this model. The instruments used in each specification are in table3 in appendix C. 
       Assuming that some of the endogenous variables are predetermined in levels, the demand 
equations are estimated with (?) differences by generalized method of moments (GMM), using their 
lags as instruments (Arellano and Honoré, 2001). Besides, the models are also estimated by system 
GMM using additional conditions proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998) 13. Then the set of 
instruments are14 1    j j jZ Z Zτ = … …  , and the orthogonality conditions are given by equations (12) 
and (13)15. 
( ) ( ) 0'   d d d d d dj j jE g E Z conθ ξ δ θ θ   = ∆ =    = 0                                                                                 (12) 
( ) ( ) 0'     L L L L L Lj j jE g E Z conθ ξ δ θ θ   = ∆ =    = 0                                                                               (13) 
Equation (14) represents a set of consistent estimators of the models, where W is a symmetric 
positive definite square matrix ( mxm , with m  being the quantity of instruments in jZ ) and 
                                               
12
 These instruments can fail if cost variables reveal components of quality of the products that are not constant in the time and are not 
captured by the demand specification. In this sense, it is expected that the demand functions are properly specified. 
13
 See appendix B. 
14
 Where ( )1 2 2   j j j j TZ z z zτ τ τ τ −
′ = … 
 
15
 See Robert et. al. (2002) for a further analysis of the independency between these markets. 
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converges in probability to a non-stochastic matrix. In this case, the estimator in (14) is linear in the 
parameters.  
( ) ( )








= ∑∑
Θ∈
J
j
j
mxm
J
j
j
J
θg
  
J
θg
J Wˆ
'
  
 minargˆ
θ
θ                                                                                    (14) 
 
Where the optimal weighted matrix is 1
1
''*
−
= 













∆∆= ∑ JZZEW
J
j
jjjj ξξ  and it is used to calculate the 
estimations, the tests and the standard deviations. Table 1 shows the results for the estimations of the 
parameters. The Hansen tests of joint validity of the instruments, under the proposed specification, 
reject the hypothesis of endogenous instruments, and the tests of correlation of the residuals in levels  
do not reject the proposed specifications. 
IV. Identification and construction of the variables 
Sources of data 
The coverage of the sample is the first quarter of 2005 to the first quarter of 2007. This period 
is relevant due to its relative financial and macroeconomics stability. The aftermath of Argentina’s 
economic crisis of 2001 showed important distortions in the balance sheets of the financial firms. 
Therefore, the selection of a period of relative favorable macroeconomic expectations is a key for 
understanding the potential trends of competence in the Argentina’s financial market.  
Most of the data is obtained from the monthly balance sheets that the financial institutions 
report to the Central Bank of Argentina, and some of the variables related to the characteristics of the 
firms are compiled quarterly. The variables related to indicators of service quality such as expenses in 
development and fixed goods are deflated by the price indexes from the National Institution of 
Statistics (Indec). 
The disaggregated information of the monthly balance sheets gives the input to calculate the 
implicit interest rates. The implicit active (or passive) interest rate is the ratio of the financial incomes 
(expenses) to the quarterly average of the relevant assets (passives). The denominator of the active 
interest rate includes loan accounts and other loans for financial intermediation, while in the case of 
passive interest rates, it includes deposits and other obligations. These definitions are similar to the 
criteria used to calculate the implicit interest rates published by the Central Bank. However, they are 
not used because they are mobile averages of the last twelve months and because they include only 
some loans and obligations. According to the Manual of Accounts of the Superintendence of Financial 
Entities, the accounts of financial incomes and expenses are reported accumulatively. Thus these 
accounts must be differentiated to obtain their monthly flows and calculate the average quarterly 
interest rates. 
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The implicit monthly rates of reference are the rate of the BCRA bills (Lebacs) and the 
interbank rate Buenos Aires Interbank Offered Rate (Baibor), both annualized. The Baibor rate is the 
average of the interbank interest rates that were offered by 22 financial institutions selected by the 
BCRA for their quality. The monthly Lecac rates are not available monthly due to gaps in the 
emissions of BCRA bills. Therefore, the two quarterly gaps were filled with the average of the 
predictions obtained with three samples with data from the third quarterly of 2003 to the first quarterly 
2007. The samples are the interest rates of emissions of Lebacs to 30-90 days, 90-180 days, 180-270 
days16. These samples were used in different ARMAX17 models to obtain predictions for the non-
available Lebac monthly rates. 
Finally, the total population and the percentage of population below the poverty line, which 
are used to calculate the potential size of the market, come from the Indec and the Ministery of 
Economy of Argentina (for further details see annex B). 
General characteristics of the database 
The sample excludes entities that show inconsistencies or outliers in their data. In this stage, 
the sample becomes two different samples according to the criteria of selection for financing or 
investment services. The former considers inconsistencies or outliers in financial incomes and implicit 
active interest rates while the latter is defined on financial outcomes and implicit passive interest 
rates. 
Therefore, four entities were eliminated for having negative flows of financial incomes or 
outcomes,18 and six entities were excluded because they reported at least two consecutive quarterlies 
without flows for loans or deposits, while reporting a positive amount of loans or deposits (after 
excluding current accounts that yield no interest). Also, the data does not include firms that showed a 
standard deviation of the interest rates larger than three times the mean of the deviations. The sample 
for investment (or financing) services also left out firms with zero deposits (or loans). Finally, an 
entity was excluded for having negative flows of general expenses for more than two consecutive 
quarters and three financial companies also were excluded because their passive rates exceeded the 
active ones. 
As a result, the samples attain different sizes. The sample for financing services has 69 firms 
(accounting for approximately 98 percent of the funds devoted to financing services) and the sample 
for investment services has 64 firms (accounting for approximately 97 percent of the funds collected 
by investment services). The nests were built based on the main target customers: individual 
                                               
16
 With 18, 17 y 12 observations correspondingly. 
17
 ARMAX(2, 2) with the series of 30-90 days and 90-180 days and ARMAX(1,4) with the series of 180-270 days. 
18
 Having into account that financial flows of incomes or outcomes are not explicitly available in the balance sheets and they were calculated 
from differentiating the accounts of results. These accounts record accumulated balances from the corresponding balance sheet date. 
 13
customers or institutional customers. The non-overlapping nests have 12 entities for institutional 
customers of financing services and eight entities for institutional customers of investment services. 
V. Results for the demand systems 
The table 1 shows the estimations of the parameter in equations (8), (9) and (11) for financial 
and investment services. Columns (1), (2), (4) and (5) are derived from a multinomial logit 
specification and are estimated by two step robust system GMM. Columns (1) and (2) share the same 
explanatory variables as well as columns (4) and (5) share the same specification. They only differ 
regarding their instruments, given that columns (2) and (5) do not include the BLP’s ones (for further 
details of the instruments see table 3 in appendix C). Columns (3) and (6) are derived from a nested 
logit specification and the transformed model is estimated by two step robust system GMM with 
BLP’s instruments. Note that even when all the estimations include GMM Arellano-Honoré and 
Blundell-Bond orthogonality conditions, they also include variables taken as exogenous and 
explanatory variables instrumented by others than their own lags.  
Table 1: Estimation Results 
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Dependent variable: 
( )( ) ( )( )0ln lnl ljt ts s⋅ − ⋅
 
GMM 
sys  
(1) 
GMM 
sys excl. 
BLP 
(2) 
GMM 
sys 
Nested 
(3) 
Dependent variable: 
( )( ) ( )( )0ln lnd djt ts s⋅ − ⋅  
GMM 
sys  
(4) 
GMM sys 
excl. BLP 
(5) 
GMM sys 
Nested 
(6) 
ra_trim_anlz -12.1135*** -11.8069*** -32.5110*** rd_trim_anlz 63.2727*** 61.5157*** 78.4147*** 
  (4.1176) (4.4270) (7.8964)   (17.3243) (17.8812) (22.3486) 
l.ln_Sh_credit 0.8716*** 0.8605**  l.ln_Sh_Inv 0.8770*** 0.8373***  
  (0.3188) (0.3998)    (0.1917) (0.2647)  
ln_Shjk_credit   0.4881*** ln_Shjk_Inv   0.7184*** 
    (0.1586)     (0.2727) 
ln_Ing_serv_over_prest_anlz -4.5939 -4.2862 -3.7562 ln_Ing_serv_over_dep_anlz -12.4364 -9.3169 -15.7043* 
  (5.0653) (5.6997) (14.4564)   (14.4589) (13.0498) (8.6239) 
ln_cred_irrec_s_act 3.9080 4.3424  ln_cgos_incob_s_act_cens   -40.1957 
  (3.5785) (3.6767)      (29.8720) 
ln_fil_Resto_t 1.4050** 1.4121*  bs_uso_s_filyDep   -0.0001*** 
  (0.5532) (0.7561)      (0.0000) 
log(l.num_Pcias_t) -2.0865** -2.0811**  L_x_fil_t   -0.0031 
  (0.9242) (0.9795)      (0.0025) 
depcia_hab_t 0.0109** 0.0109*  l.ln_ATM_s_Pcias_t   -0.1098 
  (0.0052) (0.0059)      (0.0760) 
log(L_x_fil_t) -0.1889 -0.2149  l.Gtos_des_s_filyDep   0.0009*** 
  (0.2311) (0.2889)      (0.0003) 
ATM_t 0.0040** 0.0040* 0.0025*** dummy_big   1.2670* 
  (0.0019) (0.0020) (0.0007)     (0.6915) 
log(l.Gtos_des_s_fil) 0.0392 0.0365  dummy_person   0.6812 
  (0.0563) (0.0587)      (0.5032) 
Ind_person 0.2722 0.2496  Ind_noBank   -3.9817*** 
  (0.5920) (0.6550)      (1.2915) 
Ind_cons -0.2216 -0.2456  dens_fil 0.0233 0.0143  
  (0.4335) (0.6072)    (0.0268) (0.0468)  
fil_ext_t -0.1794 -0.1912  l.num_Pcias_t 0.0483* 0.0487**  
  (0.1847) (0.2094)    (0.0276) (0.0228)  
log(l2.pl_fijo_s_rec_fin_compl_t) -0.0900 -0.0938  ATM_t -0.0026* -0.0029*  
  (0.0880) (0.0949)    (0.0015) (0.0016)  
l.dummy_prend 0.4780** 0.4745*  log(l.Gtos_des_s_fil) -0.4435** -0.4257**  
  (0.1935) (0.2488)    (0.1752) (0.1936)  
log(Prest_Card_s_cred_t) -0.1121 -0.1370  publicbank 1.4611* 1.6328  
  (0.1875) (0.2984)    (0.8513) (1.1415)  
hand_chge_t 0.2754 0.2938  Person_s_cred_t 0.0378* 0.0354*  
  (0.4435) (0.4316)    (0.0205) (0.0208)  
publicbank   -1.2542***      
    (0.4837)      
dummy_person   -2.0303      
    (2.9437)      
Person_s_cred_t   0.1428      
    (0.0926)      
Gtos_des_s_filyDep   -0.0030      
    (0.0020)      
dummy_Card   4.0673      
    (2.6371)      
Observations 467 467 604 Observations 505 505 504 
Number of entities 68 68 69 Number of entities 64 64 64 
Number of instruments 32 30 26 Number of instruments 24 22 27 
Hansen test 5.029 4.730 7.172 Hansen test 1.992 1.108 3.113 
Prob > chi2 0.754 0.579 0.619 Prob > chi2 0.960 0.953 0.927 
Sargan test 6.700 5.056 75.72 Sargan test 2.92 1.511 8.023 
Prob > chi2 0.569 0.537 0 Prob > chi2 0.892 0.912 0.431 
Wald 5964 2840 2146 Wald 2093 1643 1514 
Prob > chi2 0 0 0 Prob > chi2 0 0 0 
Ar(2) in diff. test -1.186 -1.169 0.954 Ar(2) in diff. test 1.128 1.164 -0.509 
Pr > z 0.236 0.243 0.340 Pr > z 0.259 0.245 0.610 
Ar(1) in diff. test -1.926671 -1.8003 -1.7610 Ar(1) in diff. test -2.239 -2.162 -1.749 
Pr > z 0.0540 0.0718 0.0782 Pr > z 0.0252 0.0306 0.0803 
 
References: Robust standard errors in brackets. * Significant at 10%, ** Significant at 5%, *** Significant at 1%. Temporal dummies were 
included but they are not reported. Prefix l. indicates a lag of the variable and the prefix 12. indicates two lagged periods of the variable.  
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Independent of the BLP’s instruments, the results are similar for the logit specifications. In 
case of the demand for loans, the active implicit interest rate, the lags of the market share are 
significant and show the expected sign. In case of the demand for investment services, the passive 
implicit interest rate, the lags of the market share are also significant and show the expected sign. 
Among the control variables, some are also significant though they are used as proxies of 
unobservable factors. Other more detailed characteristics would be interesting to include, but there is 
no more detailed information; therefore, the results for these particular control variables are not an aim 
of this paper19. Columns (3) and (6) shows the results for the nested logit specification where also the 
interest rates and the market shares of the entity in the nest are significant and have the expected signs. 
 All the specifications are not rejected under the standard tests. The Hansen tests -- consistent 
in the presence of arbitrary intra-cluster correlation -- do not reject the null hypothesis of joint validity 
of the instruments given the number of overidentifying restrictions. Additionally, it is important to test 
for autocorrelation of the residual error because some instruments are lags. That is the AR(2) tests in 
differences do not reject the null of no serial correlation in levels (while the AR(1) tests in differences 
do reject the null of no serial correlation in differences as expected at the 10 percent significance 
level). 
Note that the results for the logit and the nested logit specifications cannot be compared 
directly because they are constants in different equations of price elasticities. The next section 
compares the results across models.   
VI. Elasticities for the entities of the industry 
This section proposes a model of the financial intermediation business. The budget restriction 
of the entity j  for each period is determined by the equation (13).  
j j j jB L D Dρ+ + =                                                                                                                            (13) 
Where the obligations for the financial entity j  are jD , the loans jL  and the alternative 
option of investing the available funds in low risk bonds are 0jB > , or 0jB < when the entity needs 
additional funds to operate. To simplify the model and represent the relevant portion of the business, 
the budgetary restriction assumes proportional bank reserves denoted by ρ , and also assumes that 
there is no equity. Additionally, the fees charged for financial services are taken as proportional to 
their respective amounts of loans or entities’ obligations20. Thus equation (14) is the benefits of entity
j . 
                                               
19
 It is expected that some variables decrease their level of significativity due to the inclusion of a lag of the share of the entity in the logit 
specification which could be correlating with some observable characteristics. 
20
 It is assumed that the coefficients of proportionality are equal to 1. 
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( ) ( ) ( )* *(1 ) ,d l l d l dj j j j j j j j j j j j j j j jw r B D w  r B  D p L p D r L r D C L Dρ ρΠ = + + − + + + + − −             (14) 
Where the last term is the cost function, lp  and dp are the implicit fees of the related financial 
services (loans and investments correspondingly) and w  is the binary variable of equations (15). 
( )
( )
1 0
0 0
j j
j j
w  if B D
with
w  if B D
ρ
ρ
 = + >

= + <
                                                                                                              (15) 
The binary variable w  allows equation (14) to model the opportunity cost of the funds with 
two local interest rates of reference. The implicit rate of the Lebacs to one month, *dr , is taken as the 
reference rate to invest funds in a capital market asset with a low risk. That is why this is the reference 
rate for entities that have an excess of loanable funds and then 1w = . These entities have at least the 
possibility of obtaining the returns of Lebacs for their exceeding funds. Besides there are entities that 
need additional funds to finance their granted loans and thus their reference rate is the Baibor rate, *lr . 
This rate is a proxy for the interest rate effectively paid by each entity in the market, due to the actual 
rate is not reported and the Baibor is an average of the rate that the main entities have paid during the 
relevant period.  
Figures 1 and 2 show the sample average of the quarterly passive and active rates, and 
compare them with the reference rates: the monthly Baibor and Lebac rates.  
 
Figure 1: Comparison of the passive implicit interest rate and the reference rates 
 
  
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on data of Central Bank of Argentina 
 
When 1w = , the entity gains the differential between the yield obtained from its funds 
invested in loans and low risk assets, and the interests that it pays for the funds to its customers. And 
when 0w = , the entity gains the differential between the yield obtained from its funds invested in 
loans and it is assumed that it pays the Baibor rate for its additional funds. Therefore, the construction 
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of the passive interest rate paid special attention to including operations that generate expenses by 
interest and involve funds granted to the entity by its customers. As a result, the entity obtains benefits 
for the kind of service that it is providing. If it provides investment services, it obtains larger incomes 
than an entity obtaining funds from other financial institutions. The same also applies if the entity 
grants loans, comparing to the incomes that it would gain for investing in low risk assets. Thus 
services provided by financial intermediaries should be oriented to agents or kind of operations that 
are restricted in capital markets. The ability to provide services to depositors and to match differentials 
of risk and maturities to provide loans is the foundation of their added value. (See Wang, 2003 and 
Fixler, Reinsdorf and Smith, 2008) 
  
Figure 2: Comparison of the active implicit interest rate and the reference rates 
 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on data of Central Bank of Argentina 
 
After some algebra using equations (14) and (13), the benefits of entity j  are equation (16). 
( ) ( )* * * *(1 ) (1 )d d d L d d d L L d L L L Lj j j j j j j j j jp r wr w r mc s M p r wr w r mc s M Cf   Π = − + + − − + + − + − − −     (16) 
Where tM is the potential size of the market, and then d dj jD s M≡ and 
L L
j jL s M≡ . The 
marginal cost by unit of granted loan is Ljtmc , and similarly djtmc  is the marginal costs by investment 
services. Finally, jCf  are time constant fixed costs.  
Financing institutions maximize their benefits given by equation (16), where marginal costs 
vary across entities but are independent of their scale of operations. Assuming that observed prices are 
the result of an interior, pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices, then each firm makes the choice of 
modifying its price assuming that its competitors will keep their prices unchanged. As a result, first 
order conditions are obtained from equation (16). Under the existence of an internal pure strategy 
equilibrium and prices strictly positive, each entity maximizes its benefits given its characteristics 
(attributes) and the prices and characteristics of its competitors. The marginal costs can then be 
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obtained from the first order conditions in equations (17) and (18), replacing with the available data 
and the estimations of the parameters of the demand functions. 
( )( )* *1 0
L
j j jL L d L L L L
j j jL L L
j j j
C s
p r wr w r M s M
r s r
 ∂Π ∂ ∂
= + − + − − + =  ∂ ∂ ∂ 
                                                       (17) 
( )* *(1 ) 0
d
j j jd d d L d d d
j j jd d d
j j j
C s
p r wr w r M s M
r s r
 ∂Π ∂ ∂
= − + + − − − =  ∂ ∂ ∂ 
                                                        (18) 
 To compare the results across the different specifications of the demand functions, equation 
(19) provides the price elasticity for entity j  under the multinomial logit specification and equation 
(20) provides it for the nested logit one (in the same nest). See Appendix A for further details). Notice 
that the elasticity of the multinomial logit depends on the parameters, the interest rate and the market 
share of the entity, while in case of the nested logit the elasticity also depends on the share of the 
entity in its own nest.  
 
( )( )
  
1 1
j j j
j j j
s r r
r s s
α
λ
∂
=
∂
− −
                                                                                                                     (19) 
( )( )|1 1 lj j j j B j
j j
s r r
s s
r s
α
τ τλ
∂
= + − −
∂
                                                                                                     (20) 
 
Table 2: Averages of the active interest rate elasticity by deciles 
 
 
GMM sys GMM sys excl. BLP GMM sys Nested 
Deciles 
Elast.* Elast.** Std.** Elast.* Elast.** Std** Elast.* Elast.** Std** 
alpha:  -12.11 alpha:  -11.81 alpha:  -32.51 
1º -40.20 -39.17 3.87 -36.06 -35.13 3.47 -27.60 -26.86 2.73 
2º -22.58 -21.32 1.83 -20.25 -19.12 1.64 -14.88 -14.29 1.70 
3º -16.93 -16.95 2.69 -15.18 -15.20 2.42 -10.71 -11.27 2.00 
4º -14.13 -13.73 1.70 -12.67 -12.32 1.52 -9.21 -7.92 1.52 
5º -12.63 -13.35 1.38 -11.34 -11.99 1.24 -8.44 -8.95 1.68 
6º -11.74 -12.52 2.79 -10.56 -11.25 2.51 -8.01 -8.59 1.47 
7º -11.13 -11.21 0.75 -10.01 -10.09 0.67 -7.55 -7.62 1.25 
8º -10.50 -10.97 2.09 -9.47 -9.88 1.88 -6.99 -7.50 1.20 
9º -9.56 -9.84 1.27 -8.63 -8.91 1.15 -6.28 -6.54 1.61 
10º -7.24 -7.24 1.47 -6.53 -6.53 1.33 -4.87 -4.89 0.95 
Mean -15.20 -15.20 1.96 -13.66 -13.66 1.76 -10.21 -10.21 1.60 
 
*Deciles of elasticicies by descending order in absolute value. ** Average of elasticities by increasing deciles of Lerner Indexes. These 
results are obtained from the same composition of entities used for the estimations in table xx, with 69 entities. 
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of the models proposed in this paper.  
 
Table 2 shows the mean direct elasticity of the active interest rate in the demand for loans for 
the entities that are included in the sample. An increase of 1 percent in the annualized active interest 
rate, gives an average decrease of 13 percent in the market shares of the entities. These elasticities are 
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noticeable larger than the elasticities found by Nakane, M. et al. (2006) in the Brazilian financial 
intermediation industry, with an average of 1.4 percent. 
Table 3 shows the mean direct elasticity of the passive interest rate in the demand for 
investment services for the entities included in the sample. In this case, the mean elasticity among the 
estimated models is approximately 17 percent. Therefore an increase of 1 percent in the annualized 
passive interest rate gives an average increase in the market share of 17 percent. Comparing this result, 
it is similar to the average found by Nakane, M. et. al. (2006), although Dick (2002) calculated an 
average of approximately 6 percent. 
Table 3: Averages of the passive interest rate elasticity by deciles 
  
 
GMM sys GMM sys excl. BLP GMM Nested 
Deciles 
Elast.* Elast.** Std** Elast.* Elast.** Std** Elast.* Elast.** Std** 
alpha:  63.27  alpha: 61.51 alpha: 78.41 
1º 49.187 21.897 2.984 36.197 16.117 2.199 26.721 11.902 1.627 
2º 33.375 18.985 3.261 24.620 14.025 2.410 18.038 10.579 1.742 
3º 27.455 24.261 4.360 20.405 18.401 3.691 15.179 10.560 1.734 
4º 23.013 18.147 3.011 17.188 11.471 1.421 13.186 12.339 2.390 
5º 20.168 18.699 3.244 15.127 15.640 2.817 11.693 11.397 1.754 
6º 18.793 25.045 4.394 14.155 17.989 2.926 10.871 11.788 2.041 
7º 17.435 30.416 4.536 13.217 20.435 3.743 10.045 13.545 2.316 
8º 16.068 26.771 3.858 12.033 21.038 2.303 9.144 15.962 2.489 
9º 12.966 21.964 4.911 9.834 17.980 3.086 7.514 15.400 2.393 
10º 9.384 15.236 2.452 7.061 11.876 3.000 5.521 10.564 2.550 
Mean 22.23 22.23 3.72 16.58 16.58 2.78 12.50 12.50 2.12 
 
*Deciles of elasticicies by descending order. ** Average of elasticities by increasing deciles of Lerner Indexes. These results are obtained 
from the same composition of entities used for the estimations in table xx, with 64 entities. 
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of the models proposed in this paper.  
 
VII. Marginal costs and Lerner indexes 
The price-cost margins can be calculated from equations (21) and (22)21 and derived from the 
first order conditions22. 
( )( )
1
* *1
L
jL L d L L L
j j j j L
j
s
p r wr w r mc s
r
−
 ∂
+ − + − − = −   ∂ 
                                                                                 (21) 
( )( )
1
* *1
d
jd d d L d d
j j j j d
j
s
p r wr w r mc s
r
−
 ∂
− + + − − =   ∂ 
                                                                                 (22) 
The marginal costs for the multinomial specification are given by equations (23) and (24), 
while the marginal costs for the nested logit specification are given by equations (25) and (26). Note 
that the differences among these models are due to differences in the elasticities of the demand 
functions. 
                                               
21
 The spread compatible with the model can be obtained subtracting equations (21) and (23). 
22
 Note that the optimal pricing rules, the rates are both functions of the reference rates, and neither is a function of the other. 
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                                                                  (24) 
Given that this industry offers heterogeneous products, the market power of each firm depends 
on its ability to differentiate itself from its competitors. That is why the interest rates depend on the 
price elasticities of the demand function and the Lerner index considers this characteristic to measure 
the market power of the firms. The Lerner indexes are then the price-cost margins as percentage of the 
prices. 
( )( ) ( )( ) 1* * 1 1 | 11 1 1 lL L L d L L Lj j j j B j
L
mc p r wr w r s sτ τ τ
α
−
= + − + − + + − −                                                   (25) 
( )( ) ( )( ) 1* * 2 2 | 21 1 1 ld d d d L d dj j j j B j
d
mc p r wr w r s sτ τ τ
α
−
= − + + − − + − −                                                     (26) 
The Lerner Index for the loan and investment services are equations (27) and (28), and they 
depend on the price elasticity of the demand, and the share of the entity in the market (and in its nest 
for the nested logit specification). The measures of concentration based just in market shares are 
incomplete because they consider only one relevant dimension. Therefore, the Lerner index may be a 
better indicator of the market power of the entities in the financial intermediation industry. 
( )( )
1
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jL
jL L d L L L
j j j jL
L L L L
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Table 4: Average of marginal costs, margins over the prices and Lerner indexes for the loan 
service industry (ordered by deciles of Lerner indexes).  
Deciles 
GMM sys GMM sys excl. BLP GMM sys Nested 
Costs Margin Lerner Costs Margin Lerner Costs Margin Lerner 
Lc Lc % Lc Lc % Lc Lc % 
1º 0.469 0.011 2.04 0.467 0.012 2.28 0.475 0.016 3.01 
2º 0.197 0.011 3.78 0.196 0.012 4.22 0.191 0.016 5.92 
3º 0.134 0.011 4.97 0.132 0.012 5.55 0.125 0.016 7.86 
4º 0.102 0.011 5.86 0.101 0.012 6.54 0.095 0.016 9.22 
5º 0.084 0.011 6.52 0.082 0.012 7.26 0.076 0.016 10.35 
6º 0.069 0.011 7.55 0.067 0.012 8.40 0.066 0.016 11.32 
7º 0.055 0.011 8.12 0.053 0.012 9.03 0.055 0.016 12.14 
8º 0.042 0.011 8.98 0.041 0.012 9.97 0.051 0.016 13.04 
9º 0.036 0.012 9.96 0.034 0.013 11.01 0.029 0.016 15.36 
10º 0.003 0.012 14.28 0.002 0.013 15.76 0.001 0.017 21.13 
Mean 0.113 0.011 7.33 0.111 0.012 8.14 0.111 0.016 11.05 
 
 21
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of the models proposed in this paper.  
Tables 4 and 5 show the marginal costs, the margin over the costs in (local currency) and the 
Lerner indexes for both markets by deciles (of Lerner indexes). 
Table 5: Average of marginal costs, margins over the prices and Lerner indexes for the 
investment service industry (ordered by deciles of Lerner indexes).  
Deciles 
GMM sys GMM sys excl. BLP GMM sys Nested 
Costs Margin Lerner Costs Margin Lerner Costs Margin Lerner 
Lc Lc % Lc Lc % Lc Lc % 
1º 0.136 0.002 1.12 0.135 0.003 1.52 0.134 0.004 2.06 
2º 0.091 0.002 1.55 0.090 0.003 2.10 0.089 0.004 2.81 
3º 0.065 0.002 1.78 0.064 0.003 2.38 0.075 0.004 3.14 
4º 0.066 0.002 2.00 0.071 0.003 2.68 0.057 0.004 3.50 
5º 0.059 0.002 2.10 0.053 0.003 2.81 0.052 0.004 3.82 
6º 0.039 0.002 2.24 0.040 0.003 3.02 0.047 0.004 4.05 
7º 0.023 0.002 2.43 0.027 0.003 3.28 0.036 0.004 4.24 
8º 0.024 0.002 2.65 0.021 0.003 3.52 0.020 0.004 4.62 
9º 0.028 0.002 2.80 0.024 0.003 3.76 0.016 0.004 4.95 
10º 0.040 0.003 3.55 0.037 0.004 4.41 0.029 0.004 5.53 
Mean 0.055 0.002 2.26 0.055 0.003 3.00 0.054 0.004 3.93 
 
Source: Own elaboration based on the results of the models proposed in this paper.  
 
In the market of loans, the average Lerner indexes vary from 2 percent to 21 percent, while in 
the market of financial investments they vary from 1 percent to 5.5 percent approximately, depending 
on the deciles and the model23. Therefore, the possibilities of gaining a larger market power are 
mainly in the loan service market.  
Figure 3: Evolution of the average Lerner index for the loan services. 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on data of Central Bank of Argentina 
 
Figures 3 and 4 show the average evolution of the Lerner index for the loan and investment 
markets. In both markets the average Lerner indexes decrease, about 2 percentage points for the loan 
services and 1 percentage point for the investment services. One explanation of such tendency is an 
                                               
23
 There are certain anomalies in the obtained results. As a consequence of large Lerner indexes, 9.4% and 5.8% of the marginal costs are 
negatives for both models in the market of investment services and loans respectively. Some of the reasons for these results could be due to a 
lack of fit of the models, problems in the calculus of the implicit interest rates or a lack of adjust in the representativeness of the reference 
rates for these particular entities. However, the detailed study of these anomalies is out of the scope of this paper.  
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increase in the competency among entities. It is probable that this period of relative macroeconomic 
stability and favorable economic perspectives have fostered these results, given that there were not 
important changes in the structure of this industry24. Besides, the Lerner indexes for the investment 
services are lower, and although they decreased almost steadily until the third quarterly of 2006, they 
stabilized around 3.5 percent afterwards (for the nested logit specification). 
Figure 4: Evolution of the average Lerner index for the investment services. 
 
 
 
Source: own elaboration based on data of Central Bank of Argentina 
 
Independent of the model specification, the Lerner indexes have decreased. The differences 
among the models are mainly in the calculated levels of price-costs margins. Where the nested logit 
specification gives the larger levels and the multinomial logit model (with BLP’s instruments) gives 
the smaller ones.  
VIII. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the existing literature of “New Empirical Industrial Organization” 
(NEIO) applied to the financial intermediation industry in two dimensions. This is the first paper that 
estimates Lerner indexes for the financial intermediary industry of Argentina using structural demand 
models of differentiated products, and also this study proposes a model that has some differences with 
other models in this literature.  
This paper uses balance sheets of the financial intermediary institutions of Argentina during 
the period 2005:q1-2007:q1. This period showed relatively stable financial circumstances and 
favorable macroeconomic perspectives, after the recovery from the recession of 1999-2002 that ended 
up in a currency and banking crisis.  
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 Regarding the macroeconomic stability, it is interesting notice that during the third quarterly of 2006, one relevant macroeconomic 
indicator, the Embi+, showed a short term increase. That might have affected the evolution of the Lerner indexes. 
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In the proposed model, the demands of the financial services come from consumers who are 
maximizing their utility as well as financial entities that are maximizing their benefits. For modeling 
the share of each entity, I used a multinomial logit modified to consider some persistence in the 
individual choice and a nested logit approach to relax the assumption of independence from irrelevant 
alternatives (IIA). Market equilibrium is assumed to be a Nash-Bertrand equilibrium, in which each 
firm takes the prices of its competitors as given. Finally, the marginal costs and the Lerner indexes can 
be calculated from the solution of the model. 
The estimation strategy of the demand functions involves robust Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM) in two stages and instrumental variables methodologies to avoid the simultaneity 
problem; given that the interest rates, the benefits and the concentration in the market are determined 
all together. Then, two different groups of demands are estimated; on one hand the demands for 
services of financial investments and, on the other hand, the demands for loans. The instruments for 
the demand functions are known as cost-shifters, BLPs (Berry, Levinsohn & Pakes, 1995) and the lags 
of the variables assumed predetermined. 
The estimated coefficients for the control variables in the demand specifications have in 
general the expected sign. Besides, both implicit interest rates are significant at the 1 percent level. For 
the demand of deposits, this coefficient has a positive sign and for the demand of loans it has a 
negative sign. The coefficients of these rates are particularly relevant, given that they are used to 
calculate the price elasticities of each entity and, therefore, the Lerner indexes. The coefficients of the 
service fees are significant in only one specification (at only 10 percent) although they have the 
expected negative signs. For the multinomial specification, the lags of the market shares were 
significant at 1 percent, indicating some effect of signaling or persistence in the consumer choices. 
While in the case of the nested logit specification, the parameters related to the intra-group correlation 
are significant at 1 percent, which suggests that this specification may be valid. 
According to the obtained parameters, the Lerner indexes, the price minus marginal cost as 
percentage of price, were calculated from the equations of the model. These indexes are a measure of 
the market power, which are expected to be zero under perfect competition and may be interpreted as a 
proxy of the loss of social welfare. Among the results, some evidence supports the presence of market 
power in the financial intermediation industry. This is especially true in the loan market where 24 
percent and 44.5 percent of the market in the sample were concentrated by entities that had price-cost 
margins that exceeded 13 percent -- on average -- for each specification correspondingly. For the 
investment services the calculated Lerner indexes are smaller; 24 percent and 29 percent of the market 
in the sample were controlled by entities that had price-cost margins that exceeded 5 percent -- on 
average -- for the multinomial and the nested specifications correspondingly. It is interesting to notice 
that these results are obtaining without assuming collusive behaviors; in fact, it is assumed that each 
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entity fixes its prices without considering the effect of such a decision on other entities25. Also, the 
results provide some signals of an increase in the degree of competition for both specifications of the 
demand systems. During the period under study the margins estimated for the credit market had an 
average reduction of approximately 1.4 and 3.3 percentage points (the multinomial and the nested 
specifications correspondingly). Likewise, the average margin in the financial investment services 
decreased approximately 0.9 and 1.5 percentage points (though at a lower rate at the end of the 
period). These trends might be related to business strategies developed under circumstances of relative 
macroeconomic stability and after approximately five years of steady growth. Even though the 
expectations of prosperity of a country such as Argentina with a history of high uncertainty might be 
peculiar, macroeconomic circumstances may have made such trends possible. In this sense, promoting 
financial stability appears to be fundamental to encourage competition in the financial intermediation 
industry. 
 
 
                                               
25
 Regarding the fit of the model, there are some estimated marginal costs (6% for loan and 9% for investment services) with a negative sign. 
This may be a warning about the fit of the model for some entities and it would be interesting to try other specifications with a subsample of 
institutions. However the available number of observations is not enough to split the sample and obtain reliable results. 
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Appendix A: Price elasticities of the demands 
Multinomial dynamic logit model. 
The equation that models the market share of entity j  during the period t  under the multinomial logit 
assumptions is equation (1).  
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In order to derive the price elasticity in the long term when the lag of the market share of entity j is 
included as an additional characteristic, I will assume that the parameter λ is zero for the outside option. 
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Steady state and comparative statics. 
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Using equation (1) where ( ) ( )( )
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Cross-price elasticity 
( ) ( )
( )
1
exp
1 exp
jt
j t J
rt
r
s
δ
δ
=
⋅ =
+∑
         Where: ( )1 lnjt jt jt jt jt j jtp r s xδ β α λ γ ζ ξ−= + + + + +                                                 (7) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )1 1
1
exp
1 exp exp
jt
jt J
rt kt kt kt k kt kt
r k
s
p r x s λ
δ
δ β α γ ζ ξ
−
= ≠
⋅ =
+ + + + + +∑
                                                                 (8) 
 
 28
Steady state and comparative statics. 
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Nested logit model 
The market share of the product j  is given by equation (11) 
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Taking logs and differencing equation (11), the direct price elasticity in (13) can be obtained from (12) 
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The same analysis is applied to loan and investment services to derive the equations in the paper.  
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Appendix B: Description of variables 
 
Variables 
credit_t: quarterly average of loans in local currency. This variable excludes Treasury notes, Bonds and differences of valuation. 
rec_fin_t: quarterly average of deposits and selected components of other obligations due to financial intermediation. Thus 
deposits excludes funds related to services that the entities deliver on behalf of others but that are not financial intermediation 
services, as payments of subsidies to unemployed. 
Pares_cred: number of "households" above the poverty line. The "households" are assumed to be groups of 4 persons. The 
number of persons below the poverty line comes from the percentage of people below the poverty line published semiannually by 
the Ministry of Economy of Argentina, based on the data of the Survey (EPH) elaborated by the National Direction of Statistics 
(NDEC). Total urban population was obtained from the INDEC. The projections of the urban population were calculated from 
provisional data of the 2001 Census. The semiannually number of individuals above the poverty line is the total urban population 
minus the calculated urban population bellow the poverty line. In order to obtain quarterly values, they were assumed equal to the 
average of consecutive semiannually values. 
Pares_obl: Number of couples of persons whose incomes overcome the poverty line for households. Further details are similar to 
Pares_cred. 
prest_sect_privnofin: quarterly average of loan disbursements to the non financial private sector, in local currency. 
op_prest_secpriv: Number of operations by loans to the non financial private sector. It includes loans to firms and persons 
recorded by the BCRA as additional information provided by the entities. 
Un_op_prest: Unit of loans. Quarterly average amount of loans disbursements (prest_sect_privnofin) over the number of 
operations by loans for the non financial private sector (op_prest_secpriv) in local currency. 
Un_prest_Avmean: Average across t and across entities of the unit of loans (Un_op_prest) weighted by credit_t. 
Market_Cred: Potential size of the loan market. That is, Pares_cred multiplied by Un_prest_Avmean. 
Sh_credit: ratio of credit_t to the potential size of the loan market. Its log is ln_sh_credit. 
Sh_Out_Inv: outside good for the market of investments. 
Sh_Out_Crd:  outside good for the loan market. 
Un_op_inv_w_CAh: Unit of consumption of investment services. Quarterly average of the ratios of the amount of fix term 
deposits, saving, checking and current accounts to the number of operations recorded by each concept for the non financial private 
sector. 
Un_inv_Avmean: Quarterly average across t and across entities of the unit of consumption of investment services, weighted by 
rec_fin_t. 
Market_Inv: Potential size of the market of investment services. That is, Pares_obl  multiplied by Un_op_inv_w_Cah. 
Sh_Inv: ratio of rec_fin_compl_t to the potential size of the market of financial investments. Its log is ln_sh_oblig. 
ra_trim_anlz: annualized active interest rate (ratio). This is the ratio of the sum of the monthly inflows by interests to credit_t. The 
flows of interests were calculated as the monthly differences of the accumulated amounts, which are reported in the balance sheets. 
Then, each calculus took into account the balance sheet date of each entity. 
rd_trim_anlz: Annualized passive interest rate (ratio). This is the outcomes by financial obligations to rec_fin_t. Using a method 
similar to the calculus of ra_trim_anlz. 
 
ATM_t: quarterly average of the number of automatic teller machines of the entity. 
bs_uso_s_filyDep: quarterly average of the ratio of fixed assets, net from amortizations, to the number of branches and 
dependencies.  
Compet_cred_irrec_s_act: mean of the quarterly averages of the ratio of non-performing loans to assets among competitor 
institutions. 
Compet_dens_fil: mean of dens_fil among competitor institutions. 
Compet_dens_filydep_nest: mean of dens_fil among the competitor institutions in the same nest. 
dens_fil: quarterly average of the ratio of the number of branches to the number of provinces where the entity has at least a branch. 
Dependenc_compet_t: quarterly average of the number of competitor's dependencies in the national market. 
dummy_big: dummy = 1 if the quarterly average of the net assets is not lower than 1200 millions.  
dummy_Card: dummy = 1 if the percentage of credit card loans is larger than 18%. 
dummy_person: dummy = 1 if the quarterly average of the percentage of personal loans is larger than 25%. 
dummy_prend: dummy = 1 if the quarterly average of the percentage of loans pledged against automotives is larger than 25%. 
fil_ext_t: dummy = 1 if the entity is local and has at least one representation abroad during the relevant quarter. 
FilyDepend_compet_t: mean of the number of branches and dependencies among competitor institutions. 
Gtos_des_s_fil: quarterly average of the ratio of organization and development expenses net from its accumulated amortizations to 
number of branches. The organization and development expenses were deflated by an average between the retail and wholesale 
price indexes.   
Gtos_des_s_filyDep: quarterly average of the ratio of organization and development expenses net from its accumulated 
amortizations to number of branches and dependencies. The organization and development expenses were deflated by an average 
between the retail and wholesale price indexes.   
Gtos_des_t_defl_Compet: mean of organization and development expenses (deflated and net from its accumulated amortizations) 
of the competitor institutions. 
Gtos_grl_s_fil: ratio of the quarterly average of general expenses (excluding publicity) to the quarterly average of the number of 
branches of the entity.  
Gtos_grldefl: quarterly average of expenses in security services, electricity and comunications, maintenance and office supplies. 
Gtos_grldefl_s_fil_nest: mean of the ratios of Gtos_grldefl to number of branches, among the competitor institutions in the same 
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nest. 
Gtos_grldefl_s_filyDep_nest: mean of the ratios of Gtos_grldefl to number of branches and dependencies, among the competitor 
institutions in the same nest. 
Gtos_persdefl_s_L: quarterly average of the ratio of monthly flows of personnel costs to number of employees deflated by an 
average between the retail and wholesale price indexes.   
Gtos_perswS_s_L: quarterly average of the ratio of monthly flows of staff costs to number of employees. 
Gtos_perswSdefl_s_L: quarterly average of the ratio of deflated staff costs to number of employees 
Gtos_perswSdefl_s_L_nest: mean of Gtos_perswSdefl_s_L among the competitor institutions in the same nest. 
hand_chge_t: dummy = 1 since the ownership of the entity changes. 
Ind_cons: dummy = 1 if the average of the percentage of loans of no more than 500 thousands of pesos (local currency) is larger 
than 20%. 
Ind_noBank: dummy = 1 if the entity is not a bank. 
Ind_person: dummy = 1 if the average of the percentage of personal loans in total loans is larger than 20%. 
Ind_prcia: dummy = 1 if the entity has branches in more than 5 provinces. 
Ing_serv_over_dep_anlz: quarterly average of the ratio of incomes by operations related to deposits to quarterly deposits. 
Annualized ratio. 
Ing_serv_over_prest_anlz: quarterly average of the ratio of incomes by operations related to loans to quarterly loans. Annualized 
ratio. 
L_x_fil_t: ratio of quarterly average workers to quarterly average branches. 
L_x_filoDep_Compet: quarterly average of the ratio of the number of employees to the number of branches and dependencies of 
the competitor institutions. 
ln_ATM_s_Pcias_t: the log of 1 plus the quarterly average of the ratio of the number of ATMs to the number of provinces where 
the entity has banches. 
ln_cgos_incob_s_act_cens: log of 1 plus the quarterly average of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net assets. 
ln_cred_irrec_s_act: log of 1 plus the quarterly average of the ratio of non-performing loans to assets. 
ln_depcia_hab_t: log of 1 plus the average quarterly of the number of dependencies. 
ln_esd_worst3_t: log of 1 plus the quearterly average of financing to debtors with non performing loans. 
ln_fil_Resto_t: log of 1 plus the quarterly average of the number of branches in all provinces but in Buenos Aires, City of Buenos 
Aires, santa Fe and Cordoba. 
ln_Shjk_credit: log of the share of loans of the entity in its nest.  
ln_Shjk_Inv: log of the share of investment services of the entity in its nest.  
num_Pcias_t: quarterly average of the number of provinces where the entity has at least a branch. 
Person_s_cred_t: quarterly average of the percentage of personal loans in total loans. 
pl_fijo_s_rec_fin_compl_t: quarterly average of the percentage of time deposits to the non financial private sector. 
Prest_Card_s_cred_t: quarterly average of the ratio of amount of credit card loans (adjusted by an oficial price index, CER) to total 
loans. 
prev_Totnet_s_act: quarterly average of the ratio of loan loss provisions to net assets. 
publicbank: dummy = 1 if the entity is a public bank. 
y0*: set of quarterly time dummies. 
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Appendix C: Complimentary tables 
Table 1: Summary statistics for loan services 
Loan services  
Institutional 
customers 
Individual 
customers Total 
Quarterly average 
Active interest rate annualized (%) 11.68 17.22 16.29 
Branches in other (than the main four) provinces  0.00 19.35 16.08 
Branches in the four main provinces* 1.13 48.95 40.88 
Credit-card loans (% of total financing) 0.00 11.34 9.42 
Density of branches by provinces 1.09 11.82 10.01 
Development expenses to branches (ratio, Lc) 786.35 133.83 244.02 
Development expenses to branches and affiliated dependencies (ratio, Lc) 590.65 60.78 150.26 
Dummy (=1) for credit-card loans larger than 18% of percentage of total financing 0.000 0.114 0.094 
Dummy (=1) for loans under 500 mil pesos larger than 20% of total financing 0.176 0.181 0.180 
Dummy (=1) for local entities with branches abroad 0.088 0.054 0.060 
Dummy (=1) for personal loan oriented institution 0.000 0.243 0.202 
Dummy (=1) for personal loans larger than 20% of percentage of total financing 0.000 0.373 0.310 
Dummy (=1) for public institution 0.088 0.213 0.192 
Dummy (=1) for secured loans larger than 25% of total financing 0.069 0.000 0.012 
Non-performing loans (% of Assets) 8.86 8.36 8.44 
Number of affiliated dependencies 0.62 25.20 21.05 
Number of ATMs 0.07 119.64 99.45 
Number of branches 1.13 68.30 56.96 
Number of provinces 1.04 6.82 5.84 
Personal loans (% of total financing) 1.07 18.61 15.65 
Service fees (%) 1.33 3.58 3.20 
Share loan services (%) 0.08 0.71 0.60 
Share outside good for loan services (ratio) 59.65 59.72 59.71 
Time deposits to available funds (from obligations) (%) 21.66 30.49 29.00 
Unit of operation for loan services (Lc, thousands) 14.41 14.43 14.43 
Workers per branch (ratio) 70.27 42.87 47.50 
 
References: * the four main provinces produce approximately 72% of the national GDP. Lc: local currency (pesos) 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics for investment services 
Investment services  
Institutional 
consumers 
Individual 
customers Total 
Quarterly average 
Passive interest rate annualized (%) 4.33 4.64 4.60 
Fixed assets (excl. amortizations) to number of branches and dependencies (ratio) 4243.22 1115.38 1512.57 
Density of branches by provinces 1.13 11.98 10.60 
Development expenses to branches (ratio) 659.96 131.06 198.22 
Development expenses to branches and affiliated dependencies (ratio, Lc) 408.27 59.32 103.63 
Dummy (=1) for large institution 0.016 0.441 0.387 
Dummy (=1) for non-banking financial institution 0.125 0.109 0.111 
Dummy (=1) for personal loan oriented institution 0.000 0.236 0.206 
Dummy (=1) for public institution 0.125 0.214 0.202 
Loan loss provisions (% of Assets) 8.47 11.65 11.25 
Number of ATMs 0.09 122.47 106.93 
Number of ATMs to provinces (ratio) 0.09 22.43 19.59 
Number of provinces with branches 1.05 6.94 6.19 
Personal loans (% of total financing) 1.61 17.55 15.53 
Service fees (%) 1.00 3.63 3.30 
Share investment services (%) 0.13 1.54 1.36 
Share outside good for investment services (%) 14.41 14.41 14.41 
Unit of operation for investment services (Lc, thousands) 41.12 41.12 41.12 
Workers per branch (ratio) 88.81 43.78 49.50 
 
References: * the four main provinces produce approximately 72% of the national GDP. Lc: local currency (pesos) 
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Table 3: Instruments by specification. 
 
   Loan Services          Investment Services       
Instruments GMM  
sys 
GMM  
sys  
excl. BLP 
GMM sys 
Nested Instruments 
GMM  
sys 
GMM sys 
excl. 
BLP 
GMM sys 
Nested 
ATM_t x x xx ATM_t x x   
dens_fil x x   bs_uso_s_filyDep     xx 
depcia_hab_t x x   Compet_cred_irrec_s_act     + 
Dependenc_compet_t xx xx   Compet_dens_fil     + 
dummy_Card     xx Compet_dens_filydep_nest     x 
dummy_person     xx dens_fil x x   
fil_ext_t x x   dummy_big     xx 
FilyDepend_compet_t     xx dummy_person     xx 
Gtos_des_s_filyDep     ++ esd_worst3_t + +   
Gtos_grl_s_filyDep     xx FilyDepend_compet_t xx     
Gtos_grldefl_s_filyDep_nest     x Gtos_des_s_filyDep     + 
Gtos_persdefl_s_L     xx Gtos_des_t_defl_Compet xx     
Gtos_perswSdefl_s_L_nest     xx Gtos_grldefl_s_fil_nest     x 
hand_chge_t xx xx   Ind_noBank     xx 
Ind_cons xx xx   Ind_prcia     xx 
Ind_person xx xx   l.Gtos_grl_s_fil x x   
l.cgos_incob_s_act x x   l.ln_ATM_s_Pcias_t     x 
l.dummy_prend x x   l.ln_Gtos_persdefl_s_L     x 
l.ln_Gtos_des_s_fil  x x   l.num_Pcias_t x x   
l.ln_num_Pcias_t xx xx   L_x_fil_t      ++ 
L_x_filoDep_Compet     xx l2.ln_Gtos_des_s_fil x x   
l2.ln_pl_fijo_s_rec_fin_compl_t  x x   l2.ln_Ing_serv_over_dep_anlz  x x   
l2.ln_Prest_Card_s_cred_t x x   ln_cgos_incob_s_act     x 
ln_cred_irrec_s_act + +   ln_Gtos_perswSdefl_s_L x x   
ln_fil_Resto_t x x   ln_Gtos_perswSdefl_s_L_nest     x 
ln_Gtos_grl_s_fil x x   ln_Ing_serv_over_dep_anlz      + 
ln_Gtos_perswS_s_L x x   ln_L_x_filoDep_Compet     x 
ln_Ing_serv_over_prest_anlz + + ++ ln_Prest_Card_s_cred_t     x 
ln_L_x_fil_t x x   ln_Sh_Inv + +   
ln_L_x_filoDep_Compet xx xx   Person_s_cred_t + +   
ln_prev_Totnet_s_act + +   prev_Totnet_s_act ++, x ++, x   
ln_Sh_credit + +   publicbank xx xx   
Person_s_cred_t     ++ y0* xx xx xx 
publicbank     xx         
y0* xx xx xx         
 
References: + for instruments that are included in GMM collapse form from lags equal or larger than two, ++ for instruments that are 
included in GMM system collapse form from lags equal or larger than two, x for instruments that are included in IV form, xx for instruments 
that are included in IV sys form. The prefix l. indicates a lag of the variable, the prefix l2. indicates two lagged periods of the variable and the 
prefix ln_ indicates that the variable is in logs. 
 
Table 4: Average of the market shares of the entities in the sample excluding the 
outside option’s shares. 
Deciles** Loan services Investment services 
Market share average (%) 
1º 0.18 0.12 
2º 0.10 0.47 
3º 0.17 1.00 
4º 0.50 1.20 
5º 0.87 1.69 
6º 2.34 1.97 
7º 1.90 1.79 
8º 3.24 2.61 
9º 1.89 0.78 
10º 3.16 3.93 
Mean* 1.45 1.57 
 
 
**Deciles sorted by Lerner index, with the same composition of entities of the tables 4 and 5 in the paper for the nested logit specifications. * 
Average across entities. 
